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Bill Gross is the managing director of Pimco, a global bond manager.
"This is the way the world ends ... not with a bang but a whimper." - T.S. Eliot.
They say that time is money. What they don't say is that money may be running out of time.*
There may be a natural evolution to our fractionally reserved credit system, which characterises modern global finance. Much like the universe, which began with a big bang nearly 14 billion years ago, but is expanding so rapidly that scientists predict it will all end in a "big freeze" trillions of years from now, our current monetary system seems to require perpetual expansion to maintain its existence.
And too, the advancing entropy in the physical universe may in fact portend a similar decline of "energy" and "heat" within the credit markets. If so, then the legitimate response of creditors, debtors and investors inextricably intertwined within it, should logically be to ask about the economic and investment implications of its ongoing transition.
But before mimicking T.S. Eliot on the way our monetary system might evolve, let me first describe the "big bang" beginning of credit markets, so that you can more closely recognise its transition.
The creation of credit in our modern day fractional reserve banking system began with a deposit and the profitable expansion of that deposit via leverage. Banks and other lenders don't always keep 100 per cent of their deposits in the "vault" at any one time - in fact they keep very little - thus the term "fractional reserves". That first deposit then, and the explosion outward of 10 times and more of levered lending, is modern day finance's equivalent of the big bang.
When it began is actually harder to determine than the birth of the physical universe, but it certainly accelerated with the invention of central banking - the US in 1913 - and with it the increased confidence that these newly licensed lenders of last resort would provide support to financial and real economies. Banking and central banks were and remain essential elements of a productive global economy.
But they carried within them an inherent instability that required the perpetual creation of more and more credit to stay alive. Those initial loans from that first deposit? They were made most certainly at yields close to the rate of real growth and creation of real wealth in the economy. Lenders demanded that yield because of their risk, and borrowers were speculating that the profit on their fledgling enterprises would exceed the interest expense on those loans. In many cases, they succeeded.
But the economy as a whole could not logically grow faster than the real interest rates required to pay creditors, in combination with the near double-digit returns that equity holders demanded to support the initial leverage - unless - unless - it was supplied with additional credit to pay the tab. In a sense, this was a "sixteen tons" metaphor: Another day older and deeper in debt, except few within the credit system itself understood the implications.
Economist Hyman Minsky did. With credit now expanding, the sophisticated economic model provided by Minsky was working its way towards what he called Ponzi finance. First, he claimed the system would borrow in low amounts and be relatively self-sustaining - what he termed "hedge" finance.
Then the system would gain courage, lever more into a "speculative" finance mode that required more credit to pay back previous borrowings at maturity. Finally, the end phase of "Ponzi" finance would appear when additional credit would be required just to cover increasingly burdensome interest payments, with accelerating inflation the end result.